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Comment

Involuntary Commitment of People with

Mental Retardation: Ensuring All of
Georgia's Citizens Receive Adequate
Procedural Due Process

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the state of Georgia there are approximately three thousand
citizens who are confined to segregated living institutions because of
their disabilities.' Many of these individuals are placed in institutions
involuntarily through legal proceedings. 2 Some of these individuals
have mental retardation, a condition that occurs during a person's
development and results in below normal intellectual functioning.3
Many disability advocates argue that segregation and institutionaliza-

1.

Steve Gold, DD Institutions-How Many People are Still Institutionalized,
(last
visited Mar. 15, 2007).
INFORMATION BULLETIN, http://www.tilrc.org/Real%20Choice%2OWebsite/goldlO5.htm

2.

Diane M. Weidert, Comment, ConstitutionalRights of the Involuntarily Committed

Mentally Retarded After Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 1113, 1114-15 (1983).

3.

Id. at 1113.
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tion of people with mental retardation is not needed,4 although all do
not agree.5 Despite strong advocacy for the rights of people with
disabilities, many continue to be institutionalized, often because their
families can find no other path of treatment for their loved ones.6
This Comment focuses on the procedures used in Georgia to continue
the habilitation 7 of people with mental retardation. In order to commit
someone initially, Georgia's statute requires an adversarial hearing with
ample procedural protections.8 However, once the initial order for
habilitation is signed, the level of procedural protections for Georgia's
citizens drops dramatically.9 This Comment first analyzes the procedures currently in place in Georgia. Next, it analyzes what procedural
due process might require in order for a state to continue its habilitation
of a person with mental retardation. Because there has been no United
States Supreme Court decision on point, this Comment focuses on past
procedural due process decisions to outline the possible requirements.
It also analyzes the procedures that other states utilize for continued
habilitation, as the Supreme Court currently considers what procedures
are used by states when determining how much procedure is due.
After analyzing what procedural due process requires, this Comment
discusses how those constitutional rights can be waived, including what
constitutes adequate notice of rights. After outlining the relevant law,
this Comment analyzes Georgia's procedures to determine (1) whether
they comply with the proposed requirements of procedural due process
and (2) whether the statute provides adequate notice so that failure to
exercise those rights results in waiver. Finally, this Comment suggests
possible amendments to Georgia's procedures so that committed persons
receive all of the protections they are entitled to under the law and so
that no person is needlessly confined.

4. Gunnar Dybwad & Stanley S. Herr, Unnecessary Coercion: An End to Involuntary
Civil Commitment of Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1979); WOLF
WOLFENSBERGER, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ROLE VALONZATION 122-24 (Syracuse
University 1998).
5. See generally Weidert, supra note 2, at 1114.
6. Id.
7. The terms "continued habilitation" and "involuntary commitment" are used
interchangeably throughout this Comment.
8. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-40 (1995 & Supp. 2006).
9. See id.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

HistoricalBackdrop
People with mental retardation have faced a history of segregation and
isolation. Many have been confined in state-run institutions, including
mental hospitals and insane asylums. Until recently, many of these
facilities had deplorable conditions. They provided no treatment for
people and merely served as a place to warehouse people with disabilities. People were admitted with very little oversight and were then left
in these facilities until their deaths.' ° This lack of treatment is evident
from Alabama's notorious Bryce State Hospital in Tuscaloosa, which in
1970 had one physician for every 350 patients, one nurse for every 250
patients, and one psychiatrist for every 1700 patients."
Living
conditions were horrific. There were wards full of elderly people whose
families had dumped them. 12 Patients were often restrained, such as
one patient who was straight-jacketed for nine years to prevent thumbsucking.'3 Patients who died were buried in unmarked graves behind
the institution. 4 There was no fire safety equipment, as the fire
department's hoses could not attach to the fire hydrants in the
institution. 5 Conditions like these in institutions throughout the
United States sparked lawsuits and legislation that led to increased
rights for institutionalized people.
For example, in Youngberg v. Romeo,"6 a man with mental retardation who was involuntarily committed to a Pennsylvania institution
alleged that he had a Fourteenth Amendment right to safe conditions,
freedom from bodily restraints, and training. v The Supreme Court
held that people with disabilities who are involuntarily committed have
these three basic rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8
But, the Court limited the right to training or habilitation by requiring
only training that relates to freedom from bodily restraints. 9 The

10. Lauren Wilson Carr, Wyatt v. Stickeny:A Landmark Decision,ADAP NEWSLETTER
(Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program, Tuscaloosa, Ala), July 2004, at 2.
11. Id. at 1.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 3.
16. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
17. Id. at 309.
18. Id. at 315-18.
19. Id. at 318.
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Court concluded that because the respondent only sought training
related to safety, the case "[did] not present the difficult question
whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state
institution, has some general constitutional right to training per se."2°
Despite the limitation of the Court's holding, Youngberg was a crucial
case because it alerted states to the possibility that there was a minimal
constitutional level of care required for people with disabilities.
Congress's first attempt to address the problem of discrimination
against people with disabilities was the passage of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.21 The Act required that no program or
activity that received federal funds discriminate on the basis of
disability.22 But, Section 504 only covers entities that receive federal

funds, and the problem of discrimination was much broader, so in 1990
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 23 The
ADA bars employers, public entities, and public accommodations, such
as restaurants and hotels, from discriminating against people because
of their disabilities.24
Congress's second finding in the ADA is that "historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and ...
such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem."25 One of the
most common forms of isolation and segregation is the institutionalization of people with disabilities. By enacting the ADA, Congress made it
a violation of federal law to isolate and segregate people simply because
they have disabilities. States must find other ways of treating people
that allow them to live outside of institutions.
This interpretation of the ADA was cemented with the Supreme
Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C. 26 In Olmstead the Court reasoned
that institutionalization "perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life" and "severely diminishes the everyday life activities of
individuals."27 Olmstead does not signify the end of institutionalization, but it does require states to become serious about finding community placements for people who qualify and want to live outside of an

20.
21.

Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 796 (2000).

22.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (2000).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
26. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
27. Id. at 600-01.
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institution." As the Court explained, the ADA only requires that
states make reasonable modifications to their procedures. 29 In Olinstead the Court reasoned that if a state could demonstrate that "it had
a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons
with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list
that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the state's endeavors
to keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications
standard would be met."3 0
Many states, including Georgia, attempt to comply with the ADA's
requirements by maintaining an Olmstead list and moving people into
community settings at a reasonable pace. However, many people with
disabilities and disability rights advocates complain that Georgia is not
doing all it can to find community based arrangements for people with
disabilities. In Georgia, state-run facilities for people with mental
retardation are known as Intermediate Care Facilities/Mental Retardation, or IFC/MRs. Every year advocacy groups investigate complaints of
abuse and neglect in Georgia's ICF/MRs. Many critics argue that abuse
and neglect occur because people with disabilities are cut off from
society.31 Because they are hidden, there may be a lack of oversight,
which allows inhumane conditions to go undetected. Thus, advocacy
groups, such as The Georgia Advocacy Office, Georgia Legal Services
Program, and the Legal Aid Society, file lawsuits on behalf of individuals
in Georgia who are qualified for community placement. However,
resources for these groups are limited, and litigation is expensive. Thus,
most people are forced to simply wait.
B. Proceduresfor Court Ordered Habilitationof People with Mental
Retardation in Georgia
If a parent, guardian, or someone standing in loco parentis is unable
to find adequate services for someone with mental retardation, they can
petition the court to order that person to receive services from Georgia's
Department of Human Resources.3 2 The court reviews the petition, and
if it finds probable cause, issues an order that the person be examined.3 Notice of that order is sent to the person and to two courtappointed representatives. 4 The person is then examined by an

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 607.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 605-06.
Wolfensberger, supra note 4, at 12-24.
O.C.G.A. § 37-4-40(a) (Supp. 2006).
Id. § 37-4-40(b).
Id.
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evaluation team, and if the majority of that team believes the client is
in need of specialized treatment, they file an individualized treatment
plan with the court.3 5 The court holds a hearing on the petition, giving
notice to the petitioner, the person, and his representatives or guardians.3'
After a "full and fair hearing," if the court finds that the person has
mental retardation and needs to receive services from a facility, the
court may order habilitation, not to exceed six months.3 7 The full and
fair hearing includes the right to counsel and to have counsel appointed
by the court if necessary.3 " At the end of the six months, if the person
in charge of the client's habilitation believes that the client needs further
in-facility treatment, he or she must seek to continue habilitation under
Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 37-4-42.2
The process for continuing habilitation requires that the regional state
hospital administrator seek an order authorizing continued habilitation. 40 The administrator must file a notice with the Committee for
Continued Habilitation Review (the "Committee") of his intention to seek
continued habilitation of up to one year.4 The Committee is made up
of no less than five people, and its duty is to review and evaluate the
updated individualized program plans sent to them by the hospital
administrator and make recommendations back to the administrators.4 2
Within ten days of receiving notice of the hospital administrator's
intention to seek continued habilitation, the Committee must meet to
consider the application. 3 Before the meeting to consider the application, the client and his representatives are informed of "the purpose of
such meeting, the time and place of such meeting, their right to be
present at such meeting, and their right to present any alternative
individualized program plan secured at their expense."" The law does
not specify when this notice must be sent. If the client is not able to
attend, one member of the Committee is ordered to "make all reasonable
efforts to interview the client and report to the committee." 45 The
Committee reviews an updated individualized plan and then makes its

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. § 37-4-40(b)-(d).
Id. § 37-4-40(d).
Id. § 37-4-40(e), (f).
Id. § 37-4-40(d)(2).
Id. § 37-4-40(f); O.C.G.A. § 37-4-42 (Supp. 2006).
Id. § 37-4-42(a).
Id. § 37-4-42(c).
Id. § 37-4-42(b).
Id. § 37-4-42(d).
Id.
Id.
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recommendation to the administrator.46
The report must specify
whether the person has mental retardation and whether continued
habilitation is the least restrictive alternative available for treatment.47
After considering the Committee's report, the hospital administrator
must serve the Department of Human Resources and the client with a
petition for continued habilitation, along with the updated individualized
program plan and the Committee report.48 The petition must contain:
[A] plain and simple statement that the client or his representatives
may file a request for a hearing with a hearing examiner ...within 15
days after service of the petition, that the client has a right to counsel
at the hearing, that the client or his representatives may apply
immediately to the court to have counsel appointed if the client cannot
afford counsel, and that the court will appoint counsel for the client
unless the client indicates in writing that he will have retained counsel
by the time set for hearing or does not desire to be represented by
counsel."9
If a hearing is not requested, the hearing examiner conducts an
independent review of the paperwork and can order continued habilitation of up to one year.50
If a hearing is requested within fifteen days, the hearing examiner
must order a hearing and send notice to the facility, the client, his
representatives, and his attorney.5 The hearing must be full and fair,
except that the client may not be required to attend.52
When these procedures were originally enacted in 1978, the hearing
examiner was required to hold a "full and fair hearing" every time a
hospital administrator sought continued habilitation.5
This meant
that at least once a year, a hearing was held before a neutral party with
full procedural due process protections, including the right to counsel.54
This procedure remained largely the same until a 1985 amendment
removed the requirement for a "full and fair hearing" unless it was
requested within fifteen days after service of the petition.55

46. Id.
47. Id.
48.

Id. § 37-4-42(f).

49. Id.
50.

Id. § 37-4-42(g).

51. Id. § 37-4-42(h).
52. Id. The client's counsel may move to allow the client not to attend if the client is
incapable of waiving the right to attend. Id.
53. 1978 Ga. Laws 1826, 1849.

54. Id.
55. 1985 Ga. Laws 926, 930.
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As the Georgia law for court-ordered treatment currently stands, once
someone is ordered into a treatment facility, it is possible he may never
have an opportunity to be heard again. First, the Committee may meet
without the client or any of his representatives, although it is required
to give the client and his representatives notice it plans to meet."6 If
the client cannot attend, the Committee is merely admonished to make
"reasonable efforts" to meet with the client.57 However, the law does
not create any penalties for failure to meet with the client, nor does it
explain what constitutes "reasonable efforts.""8
Second, once the Committee has made its recommendation, it must
send that recommendation to the client, along with notice of the client's
right to request a hearing.5 9 The only person required to receive notice
of a right to a hearing is the client, that is, the person receiving
treatment in the facility.60 It is worth noting that the client has
already been determined to have mental retardation. If no hearing is
requested, a hearing examiner reviews all of the paperwork and then
can order continued habilitation of the client for up to one year.6 ' The
law places no burden on the hearing examiner to meet the client. Thus,
after the initial habilitation hearing, a person may be ordered to a
facility year after year through a shuffling of papers.6
C.

ProceduralDue Process

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."63 The clause "due process of law" has been interpreted by the
courts to protect two distinct rights-(1) the right to have a fair
procedure before a deprivation occurs and (2) the right to be free from
state interference with certain fundamental rights. The former is known
as procedural due process; the latter is known as substantive due
process. Procedural due process focuses on the procedures used by the
state before it deprives someone of his or her life, liberty, or property.
In order for the right of procedural due process to attach, there are two
preliminary requirements:
(1) the right being deprived must be

56. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-42(a).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id. § 37-4-42(f).
60. See id.
61. Id. § 37-4-42(g).
62. If a child is placed in a facility before they reach age seventeen, it is possible the
child will never have the opportunity to have the initial hearing. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-42(i).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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established by the U.S. Constitution or state statute and (2) the person
or entity which seeks to deprive the right must be acting under color of
state law.6
Involuntary commitment infringes upon the constitutional right to
liberty.65 Even if the initial commitment comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, confinement may become
unconstitutional if the reasons for the confinement are not present later.
In O'Connor v. Donaldson," Donaldson, a man who was civilly committed by his father, sued the hospital administrator after he was confined
against his will for fifteen years. Donaldson challenged his continued
confinement as unconstitutional because he was neither mentally ill nor
dangerous, and the mental hospital did not provide him any treatment.
The issue before the Court was whether there was a constitutional basis
for continuing to confine a patient who was not mentally ill or dangerous. 7 The Court reasoned that even if the original commitment was
based on a constitutionally adequate basis, the confinement could not
continue after that basis no longer existed.68 At the trial level, the jury
found that Donaldson was not dangerous and could easily live and work
outside of the institution. 6' Thus, the court held that "a State cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is
capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends."70
Donaldson confirms that where there is a constitutionally valid reason
for institutionalizing someone, that reason must continue to exist
throughout the institutionalization. The right to liberty does not
disappear even though there is a valid civil commitment. If the reason
for the initial institutionalization no longer exists, the state is depriving
the individual of their constitutional right to liberty. Where there is a
constitutional right at stake, the state cannot deprive an individual of
it without due process of law. Donaldson does not address the question
of what process is required by the Constitution to ensure that continued
commitment is constitutional.
1. Three-factor Test for Procedural Due Process. Once a right
has been established, the Supreme Court uses a three-factor test, first

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Heichelbech v. Evans, 798 F. Supp. 708, 712 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
Id.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 576.
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established in Mathews v. Eldridge,7 to analyze whether a state's
procedure for depriving a person of that right provides adequate
procedural due process. The first factor is "the degree of potential
deprivation that may be created." 2 With respect to degree, the Court
has noted the difference between permanent and temporary deprivations. 73 The deprivation of liberty and social stigmatization that occurs
in involuntary commitment is considered very severe.74
The second factor is the "fairness and reliability of the existing .
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards."7 5 Here, the Court focuses on "the nature of the relevant
inquiry." 16 In other words, the Court considers what decisions and
conclusions must be reached through the procedures and whether the
current procedures are adequate to reach those conclusions.77 More due
process is required when issues such as witness credibility are relevant
than when the issue to be decided is merely medical.7"
The third factor is "the public interest. . . [including] the administrative burden and other societal costs" of other procedures.79 Although
increased cost to the state is not a determining factor, the Court weighs
the increased cost of procedures against the "increased assurance that
the action is just."" Presumably the state could always increase its
procedures to assure more fairness, but the amount of increase in
procedure is checked by cost factors. Thus, if increased procedure would
be very expensive but not increase fairness and accuracy, then the
procedures are not is not required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Supreme Court Procedural Due Process Decisions in the
Context of Institutionalization. The Supreme Court has never
clearly articulated what procedures a state must use to continue the
habilitation of someone in order to comply with procedural due process.
But the Court has considered issues similar to the institutionalization
of people with mental retardation and certain trends emerge.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 341.
See id. at 340.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 512 (1972).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 343-44.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348.
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In Parham v. J.R., a class of children challenged Georgia's procedures for admitting children to institutions. In Georgia, a parent could
admit their child to a hospital for temporary observation, and then each
hospital followed its own procedures to determine whether continued
hospitalization was warranted. 2 Generally, children were admitted
and then their conditions were reviewed periodically through informal
meetings between doctors and providers.8 3 The district court found
these procedures to be unconstitutional because children had a liberty
interest in not being institutionalized, and due process required "'notice
to be heard before an impartial tribunal.' "84 In reversing the district
court, the Supreme Court held that no formal hearing was required
before commitment, but that a neutral fact finder must determine
whether the requirements for institutionalization were met.8 ' The
Court reasoned that the relationship between parents and children was
unique and that parents generally acted in the best interest of their
children. 8
The Court further reasoned that "the questions are
essentially medical in character," and therefore, judicial involvement was
not necessary.8 7
The Court did not require a formal hearing before commitment, but
the Court did note the need for periodic review, without giving any
specific requirements for that review."
With respect to continuing
commitment, the Court held that "it is necessary that the child's
continuing need for commitment be reviewed periodically by a similarly
independent procedure." 9 However, the issue of whether Georgia's
periodic reviews met the constitutional standard of due process was not
before the Court, and it lacked the necessary findings of fact to make
that judgment.9" The Court directed the district court to make this
determination on remand; there is no record of a subsequent decision. 9
In Justice Brennan's opinion, which was dissenting in part and
concurring in part, the minority disagreed with the majority's decision,
arguing that it failed to enunciate the requirements of procedural due

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 592-95.
Id. at 597 (quoting J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 137 (1976)).
Id. at 606.
Id. at 602-03.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 607.

89. Id.
90.
91.

Id. at 617.
Id.
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process after the children were initially committed. 2 The minority
argued that "the right to at least one postadmission hearing can and
should be affirmed now."93 The Court reasoned that the factors
outlined by the Court in Mathews showed that "It]he risk of erroneous
commitment
is simply too great unless there is some form of adversary
"9 4
review.

The Court also considered a similar challenge to Pennsylvania's laws
for the commitment of children in Secretary of Public Welfare v.
Institutionalized Juveniles.95 In Juveniles institutionalized children
challenged the voluntary admission procedures of their state. 6 With
respect to children with mental retardation, admission was only
permitted after a referral by a physician and a mental examination.
Additionally, the director of the institution was required to perform an
independent evaluation of the children.9 7 The Court held that these
procedures comported with the requirements of due process, as thorough
background investigations were taken and an independent evaluation
was conducted.98 As in J.R., the Court did not decide whether the
state's postadmission procedures comported with due process requirements. 99

The minority again disagreed with the majority's approach and would
have condemned Pennsylvania's postadmissions procedures as failing to
comply with procedural due process." ° The postadmissions procedures
required that the children be informed of their right to a hearing and
given the telephone number of an attorney.'' However, the procedures placed the burden of contacting counsel and initiating the hearing
on the institutionalized child.'0 2 The minority concluded that this
procedure did not meet the requirements of due process because "[i]f...
constitutional rights ... are to be guaranteed in substance as well as in
form and if the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are to be
satisfied, then waiver of those constitutional rights cannot be inferred
from mere silence or inaction on the part of the institutionalized

92. Id. at 625-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 639.
95. 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
96. Id. at 643.
97. Id. at 648.
98. Id. at 649-50.
99. Id. at 650 n.9.
100. Id. at 651 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

101. Id.
102.

Id.
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child.""' The minority noted that "[m]any of the institutionalized
children are unable to read, write, comprehend the formal explanation
of their rights, or use the telephone. Few, as a consequence, will be able
to take the initiative necessary for them to secure the advice and
assistance of a trained representative." 4
Another Supreme Court case that provides insight into the requirements of procedural due process is Vitek v. Jones.0 5 The issue in Vitek
was whether prisoners were entitled to procedural protections, such as
notice of an adversarial hearing, before being transferred involuntarily
to a state mental hospital.'0 8 The Court held that there was a liberty
interest in not being placed in a mental institution needlessly, despite
the fact prisoners had already lost their right to be free from confinement. ' 7 The only procedure required before the state transferred an
inmate was a certification from a physician that the inmate suffered
from a mental disease or defect and needed hospital treatment.' 8 The
Court held that procedural due process required much more: notice, a
hearing, an opportunity to present witnesses and to cross-examine, an
independent decisionmaker, written findings of fact, and legal counsel. ' 9 The Court particularly stressed the right to legal counsel
because "[a] prisoner thought to be suffering from a mental disease or
defect ... is more likely to be unable to understand or exercise his
rights.""'
The state was required to provide counsel to indigent
prisoners if it sought to place them in a hospital."'
These cases demonstrate several important points. First, with respect
to the institutionalization of children, both the majority and the minority
of the Supreme Court agreed that procedural due process required some
periodic review. However, the Court could not and did not agree on the
specific contours of that review. The minority opinions in Parham and
Juveniles stressed the danger of placing the burden of receiving review
on the institutionalized child. But, these cases both involved juveniles,
and the commitment of adults requires more procedural due process, as
discussed below. In the Vitek case, the Court stressed the importance
of counsel so that inmates being committed would not waive their
constitutional rights. The case also illustrates the importance of the

103. Id. at 651-52.
104. Id. at 651 (citation omitted).

105.

445 U.S. 480 (1980).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

483.
487-88.
489.
494-95.
496-97.
497.
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right to be free from unwarranted institutionalization-it is a right that
survives even incarceration and must be protected through procedural
due process.
3. Georgia Courts' Procedural Due Process Decisions in the
Context of Institutionalization. A district court in Georgia has
recognized the right of involuntarily institutionalized persons to hold an
adversarial procedure to challenge their confinement, and the court
differentiated between the rights of children and adults."2 In Heichelbech v.Evans,"' an incapacitated adult challenged the state's requirement that his guardian consent before either discharging him or
conducting a hearing to determine if he met the criteria to be an
involuntary patient."4 The state's position was that only the guardian
had the right to exercise due process on behalf of the incapacitated
ward."5 The court held that the state had deprived the plaintiff of his
due process rights by not initiating a hearing after his request to be
released." 6 The court reached its conclusion by distinguishing Parham. The court reasoned that the relationship between a "parent and
his minor child is very different from the relationship between a
guardian and his adult ward."" 7 The plaintiff "had a constitutionally
protected interest in being free from involuntary confinement, and due
process requires that he be afforded an adversary proceeding to
challenge his confinement." 8 Therefore, the court in Heichelbech held
that even people who have been declared incompetent have the right to
an adversarial
hearing to challenge their confinement in an institu11 9
tion.
Prior to the 1985 amendments to the continuing habilitation statute,
all clients were given a yearly hearing to determine whether they still
met the requirements for admission. 2 ° The Georgia Supreme Court
indicated in dicta that those "full and fair hearings" comported with
procedural due process.' 2 ' In Clark v. State,'22 a man found not
guilty by reason of insanity challenged Georgia's procedures for

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Heichelbech v. Evans, 798 F. Supp. 708 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
798 F. Supp. 708, 712 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
Id. at 711.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 715.
See 1979 Ga. Laws 734.
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admitting him to a mental hospital. 2 ' After a jury found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, the court had to determine
24
whether the acquittee met the requirements for civil commitment.
The court could defer its decision for thirty days, after which it was not
required to hold a hearing. 2 ' The court determined that the acquittee
had a right to a hearing, but that the right could be waived by the
failure of the acquittee or their representative to file an application for
release. 1 26 The court compared this to the right of an individual with
a developmental disability to waive a commitment hearing. 127 Clark
indicates there is a right to a hearing, but so long as the individual
receives notice of the right to a hearing, the individual's procedural
rights are protected. The court interprets the individual's failure to
request a hearing as a waiver of their constitutional right to a hearing.'28 Waiver of constitutional rights is discussed in Part II.D. of this
Comment.
4. Practices of Other States. In addition to the three-factor
analysis, courts also look to the history of the processes other states
provide to determine how much process is due. This historical and
comparative approach was used by the Supreme Court in Burnham v.
In Burnham the Court analyzed
Superior Court of California.29
whether the practice of "tagging" a person with service of process in a
state comported with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 ° The establishment of personal jurisdiction by tagging
is based on the theory that a state has personal jurisdiction over any
person appearing within its borders. Thus, if a person can be served
with notice of the suit while in the borders of the state then the state
has valid jurisdiction over them. A man who was tagged with service in
California challenged the state's personal jurisdiction over him based on
the Supreme Court's reasoning that a state could only exercise personal
jurisdiction if it satisfies the Due Process Clause and does not violate
To
"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."""'
determine whether tagging comported with the requirements of fair play

123.

Id. at 631, 266 S.E.2d at 469.

124. Id. at 641, 266 S.E.2d at 474-75.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 475.
129. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
130. See id. at 608. "Tagging" is when notice of a suit is served on a person who is
physically present in the state. See id. at 607-08.
131. Id. at 608-09 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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and substantial justice, the Court noted that tagging was a very old
method of establishing personal jurisdiction. 132 The Court reasoned
that the practice was used in all of the states and by the federal
government, and the Court upheld the practice.1 33
Thus, when
determining what due process requires, the Supreme Court considers the
practices of the states and the federal government.'" Therefore, an
analysis of the processes used in other states for continuing commitment
or habilitation of people with mental retardation is useful for outlining
the requirements of the due process clause.
Some states do not have judicial proceedings for the admission of
people with mental retardation; however, states such as Arizona.. 5 and
3 8
Massachusetts"
commit people with mental illnesses. Disregarding
those states, there are two major categories of procedures for continuing
habilitation or involuntary commitment in states: (1) a statutory right
to a hearing that must be requested and (2) automatic hearings to
determine continuing need for commitment.
Georgia is in the first category, but the practices of these states vary
widely. Some states, such as Mississippi, are similar to Georgia in that
the only person given notice137of their right to a hearing is the person who
was previously committed.
The second category consists of states that hold automatic hearings,
such as Ohio, 3 ' California,' 39 and Louisiana.'40
The amount of
time that passes between the initial commitment and a subsequent
judicial hearing varies greatly. 4
Connecticut takes a unique approach: the client is informed yearly of their right to request a hearing,
but if a hearing
has not been requested in five years, one is held
42
automatically.
Various conclusions can be drawn from looking at how other states
deal with continuing commitment of people with mental retardation.

132. Id. at 611-14.
133. Id. at 615, 628. Not all states still used the process, as some had held that it was
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's rationale, but the majority did not count those
states. Id. at 615.
134. Id. at 615-16.

§ 36-560F

135.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

136.

Dybwad & Herr, supra note 4, at 760.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-99 (2005).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.761(H)(4) (2001 & Supp. 2006).

(2003).

137.
138.
139. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6500 (West 1998).
140. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:454.7.A (Supp. 2006).
141. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.761(H)(4) (two years) and CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6500 (one year).
142. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17(a)-276(d) (2006).

2007]

INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

727

First, many states do not involuntarily commit people with mental
retardation (although they may commit people with mental illnesses),
which indicates there may be a trend to stop the practice entirely.
Second, Georgia's procedures are not among the worst of states, but they
are not among the best-those that provide automatic judicial review.
If the Supreme Court were to analyze what procedures are required to
meet the traditional notions of fairness, it would likely note that there
is no consensus among the states. And if a trend were to be gleaned
from the data, the trend would be a movement away from using
involuntary commitment and towards automatic judicial review when
involuntary commitment is used.
Minnesota is a useful example of one of the states that provide
automatic judicial review, because its automatic review was established
by the Minnesota Supreme Court after a procedural due process
challenge. In In re Harhut,'" the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed
its commitment procedures for people with mental retardation.'"
Under Minnesota's procedures, people with mental retardation were
committed for an indefinite period of time, and there was no statutorily
required review; however, there was review for people with chemical
dependency or mental illness.'45 The petitioner in the case, a blind
man with mild mental retardation, presented an equal protection
argument.'" He argued there was no rational basis for the state to
differentiate between people with mental illness and people with mental
retardation. The state argued that there were sufficient safeguards in
place because patients had the statutory right to petition for judicial
review and that patients had court-appointed attorneys.'4 7 The court
rejected the petitioner's equal protection argument but nearly held that
the statute violated procedural due process because "[i]ndeterminate
commitment does raise a serious due process issue since the patient's
basic personal liberty is affected."" 4
The statute was only held
constitutional because of the state's explanation of the process.'49 The
court was satisfied with the procedure because all patients had counsel,
and the court had faith in the attorney's "responsibility as a vigorous
advocate for the client's rights." 5 °
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145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

385 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1986).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 309 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.12 (2003)).
Id. at 306, 310.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id.
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But, the court did insist on additional procedural safeguards being
added. First, the court required that all periodic medical reviews be sent
to the court that committed the person, as well as to the person's
counsel.151 The court made clear the importance of having counsel and
directed the committing court to automatically appoint new counsel if
the previous counsel could no longer serve." 2 Second, the court
required a judicial review of every indefinitely committed person at least
once every three years. 5 ' The court explained that this three year
review was in addition to the patient's right to request a hearing."M
The exact nature of the hearing would depend upon the person:
In many such reviews, the severity of mental retardation may be so
manifest that the court will find it unnecessary to go into great detail
or take adversary testimony. In other cases, where the degree of
retardation is not as great and substantial progress has occurred, full
adversary proceedings similar to that for initial commitment... may
be in order.'55
The purpose of the hearing would be not only to determine whether the
person met the requirements of commitment, but also whether institutionalization was the least restrictive alternative treatment avail156
able.
Other lower courts that have considered the issue have also concluded
that procedural due process requires periodic judicial review of
involuntarily committed people with mental retardation, though for
varying reasons. In Doe v. Austin,'57 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a district court's determination that Kentucky's
involuntary commitment procedures violated due process and equal
protection. 1 58 At the time, Kentucky considered commitments that
were initiated by a parent or guardian to be voluntary, despite the fact
there was no regard for the "the actual wishes of the committed
person." 59 The circuit court affirmed the decision of the district court
that "the commitment of mentally retarded adults by the Commonwealth

151.
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153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 312-13.
848 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1392.
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by a parent or guardian is to be considered involunupon 1application
, °
tary. 6
However, the circuit court did not agree with the district court that
procedural due process required judicial hearings before Kentucky
involuntarily committed an adult with mental retardation.' 61 While
the court agreed that there must be some process with a neutral
factfinder, "due process does not require that the neutral trier of fact be
legally trained or a judicial or administrative officer.""6 2 Instead, the
court relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning from Vitek, holding that
minimum procedures should include notice, a hearing, an opportunity to
present testimony, an independent decisionmaker, written findings of
fact, and independent legal assistance.' 63 Following the same reasoning, the court affirmed that due process required some postcommitment
periodic review but did not require that the review be judicial."64
Because preadmission and periodic judicial review were provided to
mentally ill individuals, the court determined there was no legitimate
interest that justified denying people with mental retardation the
1 65
Thus, the
periodic review provided to people with mental illness.
retardation
with
mental
people
court concluded that judicial review for
Amendwas not required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
66
ment, but it was required by the Equal Protection Clause.'
This opinion was partially reversed by the Supreme Court's decision
in Heller v. Doe. 167 In Heller a class of involuntarily committed people
with mental retardation asserted an equal protection challenge against
the differences between Kentucky's commitment schemes for people with
mental retardation compared to people with mental illness. There were
two differences in the commitment schemes. First, the burden of proof
for mental retardation was clear and convincing evidence, while for
mental illness it was beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, guardians and
immediate family members could participate as parties in the commitment proceedings of people with mental retardation, but not in the
proceedings of people with mental illness.'6 8 The Court analyzed these
differences using a rational-basis test, meaning there must be "a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
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governmental purpose."169 The Court held that there was a rational
basis for the distinction between people with mental retardation and
mental illnesses.170 First, mental retardation is easier to diagnose
than mental illness, and thus, the risk of an incorrect decision is
reduced.' 7 '
Second, the Court concluded that the parents and
guardians of people with mental retardation would have valuable
72
insights that should be considered in the commitment process.
Therefore, the differences in the procedures used for people with mental
retardation and mental illnesses do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Additionally, the Court held
that the party status of parents and guardians did not violate the
procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, either.'74 The Court reasoned that the accuracy of the proceedings
would likely be increased by parental or guardian involvement, and the
parties did not allege that their participation could decrease the
17
accuracy. 1
Another state supreme court that considered the issue determined that
procedural due process required periodic judicial reviews for involuntarily committed people. In Fasulo v. Arafeh, 7 6 two women petitioned for
writs of habeas corpus, arguing that Connecticut's commitment
procedure violated due process.7 7 At the time, once a patient was
committed, they could be released through three possible procedures: (1)
the patient could petition for a hearing; (2) the supervisor of their
institution could discharge them; or (3) the patient could seek habeas
corpus relief.'
In order to evaluate these procedures, the court noted
that it was necessary to "take account of the controlled and often
isolated environment of the mental hospital. " 1 79 The court found the
first procedure-the patient petitioning for release-lacking for two
important reasons.8 0 First, only the state has the authority to confine
someone when it proves they meet the qualifications of commitment,

169. Id. at 319-20.
170. Id. at 321.
171. Id. at 321-23.
172. Id. at 329.
173. Id. at 330.
174. Id. at 332-33.
175. Id. at 333.
176. 378 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1977).
177. Id. at 554.
178. Id. at 556, 558.
179. Id. at 555.
180. Id. at 557.
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thus the burden of proof must remain on the state.181 Second, placing
the burden on the committed person ignores the practical considerations
of living in an isolated and segregated environment.8 2 The court even
doubted whether informing the person of their right to a hearing was
sufficient, stating:
[Ilt ignores the practical difficulties of requiring a mental patient to
overcome the effects of his confinement, his closed environment, his
possible incompetence and the debilitating effects of drugs or other
treatment on his ability to make a decision which may amount
to the
18 3
waiver of his constitutional right to a review of his status.
The court held that the second method of release-initiated by the
manager of the institution-was lacking because it was too discretionary
and could not guarantee accuracy and fairness. 8' And finally, the
court also found habeas corpus lacking because it placed the legal
burden on the patient.8 5
Thus, procedural due process requires
periodic state-initiated judicial reviews with full procedural protection
where the burden of proof rests on the state.18 6
In Wyatt v. King,'87 Alabama's lack of postcommitment procedure
was held to violate the Due Process Clause."s Wyatt involved a class
action against the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
challenging the constitutionality of Alabama's commitment scheme. 18 9
At the time, Alabama had 1800 residents in its mental hospitals, and
ninety percent of them were there through involuntary commitment. 19°
After concluding there was a right to be free from involuntary commitment if the reason for initial commitment no longer existed, the court
then considered how much process was required to "'minimize the risk
of erroneous decisions.'"' 9 ' The court noted that many other courts
that had considered the issue decided that some periodic review was
required.'9 2 The court distinguished an Eleventh Circuit decision that
held that people committed after being found not guilty by reason of

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 558.
186. Id.
187. 773 F. Supp. 1508 (M.D. Ala. 1991) vacated as moot, No. CIV. A 3195-N, 1998 WL
13830 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 1998).
188. Id. at 1517.
189. Id. at 1509.
190. Id. at 1511.
191. Id. at 1513 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb., 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)).
192. Id. at 1514-15.
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insanity were not entitled to periodic proceedings.19 3 The liberty
interest at stake for someone who has committed a crime is much less
than for someone who has been involuntary committed.'
In the end,
the court relied not only on the legal precedents of other courts to
consider the issue, but also on the real-life experience of one of the
plaintiffs in the case:
[The] case of patient "L.M.'"-who has been involuntarily civilly
confined for over 20 years-by itself provides a compelling reason of
why review which is judicial in nature and reasonably periodic is
minimally necessary ...
The least the state owed her over these
many years was a periodic formal hearing, with all the trappings of an
initial commitment proceeding, to assure to a reasonably high degree
of certainty
that her continued confinement was to her and society's
19 5
benefit.
The court concluded that the due process balance falls in favor of
periodic judicial review.'96
Every court that has considered the issue has determined that the
Constitution requires some form of postcommitment periodic review.
However, not all agree that the review is required by the procedural Due
Process Clause, and not all agree that the review must be judicial. Some
are satisfied with an independent review procedure, even if it is not
judicial in nature. Many courts emphasize the importance of the right
to counsel, particularly when the committed person might waive his or
her constitutional right to a hearing.
D.

Waiver of a ConstitutionalRight

Assuming arguendo that procedural due process requires that
institutionalized persons be given the right to a hearing, what constitutes a waiver of that right? Under Georgia's procedure, the institutionalized client is informed in writing of his right to a hearing.'9 7 Does
the client's failure to request the hearing constitute a viable waiver of
that right?
The first issue is whether the notice given to people meets the
requirements of due process. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
TRust, "9' 8 the Court set the standard for sufficient notice under the

193. Id. at 1515 (citing Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1984)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1516.
196. Id.
197. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-42(f) (Supp. 2006).
198.
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Fourteenth Amendment."9 The Court stated: "An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to
be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 2° The
Court reasoned that "when notice is a person's due, process which is a
mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as
one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it."" 1 The notice must be such that it is reasonably
calculated to inform the person of their right to a hearing.2"2
The Supreme Court has addressed the waiver of the right to procedural due process in the realm of a property deprivation. In Fuentes v.
Shevin,0 3 the Court held that property purchased under a conditional
sales contract could not be seized through replevin without first
providing procedural due process.20 ' In that case, the contract provided that in the event payments were missed, the property would be
"take[n] back."2"' The Court reasoned that "a waiver of constitutional
rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear."2"
In the context of other constitutional rights, such as the right to
counsel for a criminal defendant, the Court requires that the right be
waived "knowingly and intelligently."2 7 There can be no waiver from
a silent record.2"' Arguably, the right to a hearing falls somewhere in
between these two levels of protection. First, the waiver must be "clear."
Second, because there is a liberty interest at stake, it may be the state's
burden to prove that the person waived their right to a hearing
knowingly and intelligently.
If the failure to request a hearing is to act as a waiver of the
constitutional right to the hearing, then the waiver must be made
voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. In Lynch v. Baxley,20 9 the
court held that Alabama's procedures for involuntary admission to
mental institutions violated procedural due process.2 ° The court held
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See Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 260 (1967).
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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that a precommitment hearing was required and that only a "knowing
and intelligent waiver of constitutional safeguards" was acceptable.2 1'
If the person is incapable of giving consent to the waiver of constitutional rights, then "after appropriate inquiry and finding
212 of facts, the court
may approve such waiver for good cause shown."
In one interesting case, a court held that the notice given to people
with disabilities violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
"ADA"). In Armstrong v. Davis, 213 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether the California penal system's notification of rights
was sufficient for people with disabilities.2 4 While the court did not
decide the case on constitutional grounds, it did rule that the procedures
violated the ADA.215 The court held that the procedures violated the
ADA by denying people with disabilities the benefits of state services.216 The court reasoned, "At the notification stage, disabled prisoners
and parolees routinely waive their rights to hearings, frequently because
they cannot comprehend the information provided to them."2 17 The
penal department made little or no effort to communicate notification in
a way that people with disabilities would understand. For example,
notice of rights was not provided in Braille for people who are blind.2 8
The court confirmed the lower court's injunction requiring that the penal
system improve its methods of communications with people with
disabilities so that they may receive actual notice of their right to a
hearing.219
The required amount of notice is thus bound by the Due Process
Clause as well as the ADA. Once sufficient notice is given, the state
must show that the person's failure to exercise their right was a knowing
and voluntary waiver of that right. Thus, notice and waiver are linked.
If the notice does not sufficiently inform the person of their right to a
hearing, their failure to request one cannot constitute a waiver of that
right.
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ANALYSIS

While the Supreme Court has yet to definitively rule on the issue of
what procedures a state must use to continue the involuntary commitment of someone with mental retardation, some guidelines are clear.
First, a person's right to personal freedom continues to exist even after
they have been involuntarily committed. Because people still have a
substantive right, the state must utilize some procedure in order to
continue to deprive them of that right.
There are two major indicators of what due process requires: first, the
three-factor balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,22 ° and second, what
procedures states currently use to determine what constitutes "fair play,"
as described in Burnham.221 In this arena, the results of the threefactor test come down to a basic balancing of two competing interests-the interest of the individual to be free from unnecessary
confinement and the interest of the state to avoid expensive and
unnecessary procedures.
In comparison to other states, Georgia's
procedures are similar to the majority of states, although it is somewhere in the middle of the range of procedures, which range from one
extreme of no statutory review system of any kind to the other extreme
of full adversarial hearings held yearly.
A. What Proceduresare Required for Continued Habilitationto
Comport with the Due Process Clause
The first factor to be analyzed is "the degree of potential deprivation
that may be created."222 In commitment cases, the potential deprivation is continued deprivation of personal liberty. Personal liberty is one
of the most closely protected rights in the Constitution. As such, states
can deprive people of it only when there is substantial procedural
protection.
The second factor is the "fairness and reliability of the existing...
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards."22 Here, the Court focuses on "the nature of the relevant
inquiry."224
'
There are two major considerations a court must determine when deciding whether to order someone to receive continued
habilitation: (1) whether the client has mental retardation and (2)

220.
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424 U.S. 319 (1976).
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.
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whether they are in need of treatment in an institutionalized setting.
The first question is mainly a medical determination, and it is not likely
to change with the passage of time. Thus, it is unlikely a judicial
hearing is required to make this determination.2 25
However, the
second determination, whether the person needs in-facility treatment, is
one that could best be decided through an adversarial hearing. The
court also needs to decide if there is a less restrictive environment for
the person to receive treatment. For example, different experts and
evaluators may disagree on the ability of the person to live independently. Additionally, family and community members may be able to provide
to the person support that lessens their need for institutionalization.
Thus, the second determination is one in which the courts would benefit
from a full hearing.
To fully evaluate the second factor one must compare the fairness and
reliability of the current procedure-notice to the client of their right to
a hearing-to a hearing that is held automatically. On the one hand,
the current procedures might be fair and reliable for clients who are able
to read and understand their rights and are able to request a hearing.
One might argue that those clients are the ones who are least in need
of institutionalization. But understanding the implications of the right
to have a hearing is a complex idea, and even those who may not fully
understand or know how to exercise that right may be capable of living
outside of an institution. The current procedure is unfair to those clients
that do not understand their rights but nonetheless could live outside of
the institution.
It is also questionable how reliable the current
procedure is because it places the burden of exercising important rights
on the client. Many courts that have considered their state's process
have voiced concern with placing the burden of exercising a constitutional right solely on the institutionalized person because to do so ignores
the realities of their situation.
The third factor is "the public interest ...includ[ing] the administra2 26
tive burden and other societal costs" of having automatic hearings.
This factor is difficult to analyze as there is a lack of data regarding how
many people are involuntarily institutionalized in Georgia. There are
at least 3000 Georgians living in congregate (more than seven-person)
segregated living facilities. 22 7' Even if only half of them are institutionalized against their will, there will still be an increased cost to automatically hold adversarial hearings yearly. The cost of these hearings may
be prohibitive. One strong indication that the cost may be prohibitive
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is that in 1985, Georgia's legislature amended the continuing habilitation statute to remove automatic hearings.228 It is possible that these
hearings were becoming expensive and burdensome on the state; so the
legislature decided to remove them.
Accordingly, after analyzing the factors from Mathews, Georgia's
current procedures fall short of what due process requires. Because the
right to liberty is so fundamental and the fairness and reliability of the
current procedure is lacking, increased procedures are needed. But, the
cost of holding automatic hearings may be burdensome on the state's
resources and outweigh the added benefit of additional due process
protection. Thus, to balance the important concerns of adequate due
process and wise allocation of the state's precious resources, this
Comment suggests various compromises, mainly modeled after Minnesota's procedures.
B. Problems with Georgia'sCurrent Proceduresand Potential
Changes
There are several problems with Georgia's current procedures. First,
and most importantly, the only person who is given notice of the right
to a hearing is the person who is institutionalized. 229 That person has
already been judged by a court to have mental retardation and to be in
need of treatment. It is far from certain that clients have the ability to
understand the implications of their right to a hearing and to have an
attorney. The statute requires that the notice be given in writing and
in clear and simple language. 2 0 However, this means that a person
who cannot read or is blind will receive no notice whatsoever. The
statute does not address what the state must do if the person is
incapable of understanding or reading his or her notice.
Georgia's notice of right to a hearing falls short of constitutional
standards. The failure to petition for the hearing could only function as
a waiver of the constitutional right to a hearing if that waiver was made
knowingly and intelligently. If the person is incapable of giving
informed consent to waive his or her right to a hearing, the court could
grant the waiver only after an inquiry, findings of facts, and for good
cause. Lynch indicates that the failure to petition for a hearing might
not be enough2 1to waive the right to a hearing if the person does not do
so knowingly.
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Because notice is only given to the client, who has a developmental
disability, it can be soundly argued that this is not "reasonably
calculated" to give notice. Georgia's procedure is accurately described as
a mere gesture of due process and not an attempt to communicate with
the person their right to a hearing. The only provisions in the statute
are that the notice must be "plain and simple."" These requirements
are not enough to ensure that people with disabilities understand their
rights.
Similar to Armstrong, the state has failed to "address the needs of
[people in institutions] who have problems understanding complex
information or communicating through the spoken or written word;"3 3
thus, the state has violated the ADA. By not making reasonable
accommodations to provide notice in a way that people with mental
retardation can understand, the state is depriving them of their benefit
of a hearing.
The second major problem with Georgia's statute is that if a hearing
is never requested, one will never take place. After the initial commitment hearing, there is no guarantee that there will ever again be
judicial review of the commitment. While some might argue that this is
justified by the intractability of mental retardation, there are more
issues to be resolved than just whether the person has mental retardation. In order to commit someone, the court must also find that the
person needs to receive services from a facility."M Thus, the question
to be answered is not just whether the person has mental retardation,
but whether they are still in need of treatment from a facility. People
with mental retardation have the ability to learn, and many can develop
the life skills to live outside of an institutionalized setting.
An additional benefit of automatic hearings is that hearings are
another method to ensure Georgia is complying with the requirements
of Olmstead. At the hearings, the court should analyze whether the
person qualifies for community placement and desires it. If so, the court
can use the opportunity provided by the hearing to question the state
regarding why the person has not been moved to the community. This
will ensure that many more institutionalized Georgians have the
opportunity to push the state for a community placement, not just the
lucky few who have lawsuits filed on their behalf by an advocacy group.
If a person with mental retardation is to live successfully outside of an
institution, it usually takes the support of family members, friends, the
community, or advocates. Those members of the community should also
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receive notice of the right to a hearing. There are organizations in
Georgia devoted solely to pairing up citizen advocates with people with
disabilities, and these citizen advocates should receive these notices.
These advocates can take it upon themselves to investigate possible
alternatives, such as lost or forgotten family members, group homes, and
alternative ways to receive treatment in noninstitutionalized settings.
Not only should family members and citizen advocates be given notice
of the right to a hearing, every institutionalized person should have an
attorney. If they do not have an attorney, the committing court should
appoint one. That attorney should be served with the notice as well. It
is the duty of all attorneys to vigorously advocate for the interest of their
client. It is axiomatic that it is in the best interest of every person to
live in the least segregated and least restrictive environment possible.
Thus, in order to fulfill their professional obligations, attorneys would
likely meet with their clients, do background research, and try to relieve
their clients of their commitment orders. To effectively advocate, the
attorney should investigate whether the family can take the person back
into their home and analyze what supports might be needed to make
that happen. Additionally, attorneys have specialized knowledge of the
legal field and, thus, will be more effective advocates for their clients in
a hearing.
Next, the notice that Georgia gives should be designed to actually give
the person notice of the person's rights. If the person cannot read, the
notice should be given orally. If the person is deaf, the notice should be
given in sign language or whatever mode of communication the person
understands. And finally, in the case where the person is not capable
of understanding his or her rights, it is crucial that attorneys and other
citizen advocates acting in the best interest of the person receive notice.
Finally, a hearing should be held after some number of years if there
has not been a hearing held after the initial assessment. Regardless of
whether the client or any of the client's representatives ever requests a
hearing, one should be held, perhaps every three or five years. At that
hearing, the person should be present, along with the person's attorney
and any other representative. The court should ensure the presence of
as many people who are interested in the well-being of the person as
possible. As the Minnesota Supreme Court described in In re Harhut,
the exact contours of the hearing would depend on the nature of the
person's disability."5 If it is clear that the person has mental retardation, and there are no alternatives available besides institutionalization,
there will not be a need for adversarial witnesses. However, in a case
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where the person has mild mental retardation or where people come
forward who are willing to assist in the care of the person, an adversarial hearing should be held.
The suggested mandatory three or five year hearing ensures that no
person slips through the bureaucratic cracks. What is crucial about this
hearing is that it gives the person who will be subject to the continuing
habilitation order an opportunity to be heard by the court before that
order is issued. The person will have the opportunity to explain to the
court what the person's life is like, what treatment the person is
receiving, and whether the person wishes to leave the institution. Even
if the person cannot communicate, the court will at least have the
opportunity to see the person, thereby ensuring that the person is not
being abused or neglected. The hearing also ensures that attorneys are
advocating for their clients, as it is unlikely attorneys would appear
before the court without having prepared. It also provides an opportunity for advocates and family members to develop momentum behind
deinstitutionalizing the person. For example, family members can have
the opportunity to explain to the court what services they might need to
enable them to bring the person home. When presented with a full
picture of options available, the court may have other alternatives to
continued institutionalization.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the Author, these additional procedural safeguards are a means
to an end-the end of institutionalization of people with disabilities.
That goal is endorsed not only by disability rights advocates, but also by
the Supreme Court. To force someone to live a segregated life simply
because they have a disability violates the Americans with Disabilities
Act. By requiring more than a shuffle of paperwork to continue the
institutionalization of a person with disabilities, momentum will shift
away from institutionalization and towards real homes. Procedures
prevent people from being forgotten and ignored. Their appearance
before a court reduces the likelihood that people will suffer abuse and
neglect.
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